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Abstract  
Purpose – Business schools are increasingly positioning themselves as entrepreneurial risk-takers. 
In doing so, they are front-runners of a marketization trend affecting the entire higher education 
sector. In response, governments have begun to subject higher education sectors to systems of risk-
based regulation. The purpose of this article is to study the likely impact of regulatory change on 
business school behaviour.  
Design/methodology/approach – The article focuses on the financial dimension of institutional 
performance and draws on the corporate risk management literature to derive general design 
principles for managing risk-taking in business schools. These are matched with a review of the 
regulation literature to evaluate regulatory effectiveness.  
Findings – Business schools are facing a double-hurdle test when managing their risk position. 
They need to protect their financial solvency with the maintenance of properly functioning risk 
management systems. At the same time, they will increasingly be subjected to regulatory scrutiny 
with regulatory shortcomings likely to be mapped into binding but sub-optimal behavioural 
constraints. The article offers initial reflections how business schools can cope with this double-
hurdle. 
Originality/value – Risk management in higher education, here with a specific reference to 
business schools, has so far been under-theorized from a financial perspective and, as a 
consequence, the debate on risk-based regulation lacks a proper foundation. The article addresses 
this shortcoming.  
Keywords Business Schools, Risk Management, Risk-Based Regulation, Entrepreneurialism 
Paper type  Research Paper 
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1. Introduction 
An increasing number of business schools represent entrepreneurial organizations displaying 
behavioural traits strikingly similar to private for-profit enterprises. They enjoy considerable 
autonomy from their university parents and fund themselves to a significant extent with proprietary 
revenue streams. While still maintaining their traditional focus on degree teaching and academic 
research, they are also engaged in an increasing number of commercially- motivated ventures such 
as executive training, franchising and validation of degree programs, contract research or business 
consulting. Entrepreneurialism is often justified on the basis of a revenue-for-growth formula to 
expand the school’s international relevance and competitive strength at home. Additional revenues 
can however only be earned if the provider commits financial resources for investment and is 
willing to bear the associated risks. In order to ensure long-term financial viability, entrepreneurial 
risk-taking therefore requires risk management as a natural counterpart – they are ‘two sides of the 
same coin’.  
The idea of risk – its identification, assessment and management – as an object of increased 
organizational attention is gradually pervading the field of higher education (TEQSA 2012, HEFCE 
2005). Although risk mitigation and transfer has a long history in the commercial sector, only 
comparatively recently have such notions seriously informed the actions of universities and the 
bodies that regulate them. It is reflective of the increased marketization of higher education 
institutions (HEIs) and the fields within which they operate. Business schools can be considered 
front-runners of this general marketization trend. It has been accompanied by the associated 
strengthening of universities as corporate actors with self-responsibility for their futures, rather than 
comprising a rather loose collection of academics and administrators, and with reputational 
preoccupation increasingly corporate-based rather than predominantly focused on the actions of 
individual researchers. Regulators have already responded by incorporating the risk dimension into 
their audit and monitoring frameworks and, more recently, by applying risk-based regulation as a 
means of aligning the intensity of oversight with the degree of risk carried by the HEI. 
This article studies the influence of risk-based regulation as the currently dominating form of 
regulatory intervention in shaping risk-taking behaviour of business schools. We argue that 
regulatory intervention will not induce the emergence of risk management systems, which 
adequately deal with the risk-related consequences of entrepreneurialism and marketization. Risk 
management, will in the context of this article, be analysed from a financial performance 
perspective with the understanding that reputational risk-taking ultimately impacts financial 
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outcomes, albeit indirectly and in rather complex ways. The course of analysis sets out in section 2 
with a description of the general principles of risk-based regulation as well as the current status of 
implementation. Section 3 discusses how regulatory shortcomings limit the scalability of regulatory 
scrutiny with entrepreneurial risk-taking – a central premise of risk-based regulation. Section 4 
describes the general features of state-of-the-art risk management in a business school context to 
demonstrate that the managerial response to entrepreneurial risk-taking must target an over-
fulfilment of existing regulatory standards. Regulatory intervention can nevertheless not be 
assumed to be behaviourally neutral. The concluding section offers a series of reflections on how 
rising regulatory scrutiny may create an incentive for business schools to pro-actively establish a 
risk management function modelled around state-of-the-art principles. The concluding section also 
includes a discussion of the somewhat ambiguous role of university parents as regulatory 
intermediaries.  
2. The Emergence of Risk-Based Regulation in Higher Education 
Monitoring and supervision of risk-taking have by now become mainstream regulatory activities in 
a number of countries. Since 2000, the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) 
for instance requires HEIs to maintain a system of risk controls and risk registers as a condition of 
qualifying for funding (HEFCE 2001). Periodic updates of the guides of good practice and the 
issuance of supplementary risk management templates and standards have targeted the 
establishment of robust internal controls based around risk amelioration (HEFCE 2003, HEFCE 
2005, HEFCE 2008). Most notably, HEFCE has derived a so-called risk tree, which offers an 
exemplary risk categorization, a risk ranking (high to low) as well as contributing factors, 
mitigating actions and early warning indicators (see Huber 2010 for a detailed discussion). 
Consistent with the corresponding norms established by the Combined Code of Best Practice 
targeting listed companies (Financial Reporting Council 2005), HEFCE emphasizes that risk 
represents a source of value added as well as a potential hazard for HEIs. Moreover, HEFCE 
regards enterprise risk management as a matter of high-level governance and accountability, not a 
specialist activity carried out by a small unit some distance removed from everyday operational 
routines (see also Tufano 2011 for a related discussion of this aspect).  
This elevation of risk management to a preoccupation at Board level is also reinforced by a growing 
concern with reputational risk within universities, such as from downward trajectories in university 
rankings, or as a consequence of commercial undertakings ventured internationally or domestically 
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without proper due diligence (Power et al. 2009). Broadly, the activities of academic units within 
the relatively ‘loosely-coupled’ organizations that still characterize most universities and who 
conventionally are engaged with the mainly non-prescriptive and uncertain technologies of teaching 
and research, also offer potential reputational and not easily foreseen hazards for institutions. 
Universities especially have difficulty in controlling their core functions through the typical and 
diverse risk management strategies available to other organizations. They tend to use ‘black boxes’, 
particularly the idea of ‘reputational risk’ as ‘an all-purpose tool of risk management, allowing 
universities to capture all possible challenges and problems in terms of risk’ (see also Huber 2011). 
Reputational risk in this context refers to the unexpected variation of quality proxies such as 
rankings and league tables.  
More recently, the notion of the regulation of risk has elided into the idea of regulation by risk. In 
2011, the UK government published reforms for higher education in England that envisioned 
HEFCE becoming a ‘lead regulator’ for the whole sector, including on such matters as external 
quality assurance, in which it would come to direct the previously autonomous Quality Assurance 
Agency (HEFCE 2011). In line with a strong ‘deregulatory’ and marketization rhetoric, risk-based 
regulation seems to be the order of the day. The articulated intent is to reduce frequency and depth 
of regulatory inspections for the vast majority of institutions – those deemed to have well-
established track records of compliance and quality control. Younger and especially private 
providers are regarded differently, which is based on the premise that they carry greater risk to the 
public and the consumer than other providers. They will face fewer restrictions on the capacity to 
gain independent degree-awarding status and to achieve university designation, but will receive 
more regular monitoring on quality assurance than their university counterparts. In Australia, too, 
the creation of the Tertiary Education Quality & Standards Agency (TEQSA) as the new regulator 
for the higher education system is justified on similar, risk-based grounds, and is seen as helping 
Australian universities to compete globally without onerous external regulations dampening 
entrepreneurial zeal (TEQSA 2012). 
Regulation by risk targets a reduction of the regulatory state. It does so by moving away from more 
standardized, impersonal, and ‘all-equal-before-the-law’ approaches toward a more targeted and 
proportionate form of intervention (Raban 2011). The proposal for making higher education 
regulation more ‘risk-based’ aims at reducing costs for both the regulator and the majority of HEIs, 
whilst focusing on where risk is believed most likely to crystallize (Huber 2009). The regulator’s 
risk assessments will lead to a classification ranging from ‘highest risk’ to ‘lowest risk’. When 
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checking the robustness of the systems of internal controls, most scrutiny will then ultimately be 
applied to HEIs in the ‘highest risk’ category.  
Risk-based regulation is viewed as operating in a more open and transparent manner than the 
bureaucratic, rule-compliant assessment methods of conventional ‘command-and-control’ 
regulation. Publicly justifying risk evaluations, for example, is regarded as enhancing the rationality 
and evidence-based nature of regulatory decision-making, and as enabling the marshalling of 
regulatory resources to achieve increased effectiveness and efficiency. Risk-based regulation also 
offers incentives for regulatory compliance and contains an explicit development trajectory. While 
all-inclusive, regular monitoring may be necessary during the early stages of regulatory 
development, successful implementation holds out the prospect of more selective and targeted 
regulation as systems mature. Regulatory compliance becomes induced by the prospect of receiving 
less scrutiny as a reward for ‘good’ behaviour.  
3. Regulatory Challenges and Inefficiencies 
Risk-based regulation in higher education throws up a number of difficulties; HEFCE and TEQSA, 
for example, face critical challenges in becoming risk-based regulators for higher education in their 
respective countries.  First, there is a need to decide which institutions fall into categories ranging 
from high to low risk, and then to justify such decisions openly and with evidence to both the 
targets of regulatory control and to the wider public. This challenge promises to easily mire 
regulators in prolonged controversy (King 2011). Higher education systems are characteristically 
segmented by reputation and prestige (and to a lesser extent by product), and this increases with 
marketization. The relationship between prestige and quality (especially for teaching) is not clear 
and high-prestige HEIs may escape external reviews on non-quality grounds (such as reputational 
status). These institutions may however maintain state-of-the-art risk management systems and 
could therefore contribute to the diffusion of good practices to the rest of the sector. After all, 
quality assurance is not only about accountability but also about development and the spreading of 
examples of best practice to other organizations. The application of selective scrutiny may therefore 
hamper the effectiveness of risk control by HEIs. 
A second and related point is that proper risk oversight cannot conceivably reduce the regulatory 
burden for the majority of HEIs in an environment where entrepreneurialism is gaining sector-wide 
relevance. Regulators need to accept that entrepreneurialism frequently involves well-established 
non-profit institutions, including those in public ownership. They are in fact the new entrepreneurs 
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in higher education and should therefore be the main targets of risk-based regulation. In other 
words, regulatory effectiveness is likely to require that all providers are subjected to regular 
monitoring for the purposes of ‘detection’ as well as ‘systems review’, but that risk enforcement 
can be applied more selectively (Black and Baldwin 2012). It should involve the escalation up a 
pyramid of sanctions culminating in severe punitive penalties in the event of persistent non-
compliance. 
Third, the commitment to formalized, evidence-based, and highly transparent risk assessments will 
prematurely over-narrow regulatory options. Specifically, it results in an erroneous prioritization of 
certain issues and organizations as ‘risk carriers’, leaving regulators prey to rapidly changing and 
unforeseen circumstances because of an over-commitment to original risk assessments (Baldwin et 
al. 2012). Regulators may thus become solidified in particular ways of assessing risk. While 
institutional track records justify a classification as ‘low risk’, reducing external monitoring for a 
high proportion of institutions may lead to a systematic failure of capturing risk incubation in some 
entities, for instance as a result of rising competitive pressures, and may even disconnect the 
regulator from a large part of the higher education sector. 
Fourth, regulators are likely to respond to the risk of public criticism with the avoidance of 
judgemental discretion (Baldwin et al. 2012). The concept of providing university students with 
differential levels of protection, depending on whether they are enrolled in a ‘high’ or ‘low’ risk 
institution, is likely to lead to unfavourable reactions from the ‘consumers’. In the context of risk-
based regulation, regulators are conceptualized as undertaking a finite and publicized set of tasks 
within highly transparent procedures and with clearly stated prioritizations. A culture of failure 
avoidance is likely to lead to protocolization and bureaucratic rule-following, which is the very 
opposite of what risk-based regulation attempts to accomplish (Hood 2011). As explained by 
Edwards (2012), lessons from other sectors subjected to risk-based regulation indicate that the 
benefits of deregulation are in danger of never being realized. In addition, there are a myriad of 
other regulator-specific issues to be considered as potential sources of regulatory failure (Rothstein 
and Downer 2012, King et al. 2007, Hood et al. 2001).   
Lastly, existing risk-based regulation regimes fail to offer broad coverage of the risk management 
process. They tend to be very explicit on risk identification (HEFCE n.d.), but are rather vague 
when it comes to specifying organisational risk appetite, transforming ‘risk appetite’ into early 
warning indicators on an operational level and quantifying the impact of risk and the effectiveness 
of risk mitigation. While HEFCE (2005) and TEQSA (2012) for instance mention the need to track 
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the correlation and clustering of risks, the inherent logic of regulatory oversight still follows the 
‘silo approach’ of linking individual risk factors to performance shortfalls, e.g. reflected in the use 
of likelihood/impact matrices (illustrated by The University of Leeds 2012, The University of New 
England 2012). It implies that organizations focus on ‘major risks’ and quantify risk as well as risk 
impact on a stand-alone basis. The problem essentially mimics the situation currently found in the 
regulation of the corporate risk management function (as for instance illustrated by the proposal of 
AGB and NACUBO 2007 to adopt a variant of the U.S. COSO framework). 
It follows that the basic premise of risk-based regulation, the positive relationship between 
regulatory scrutiny and perceived institutional risk-taking, may de facto never be achieved. Most 
importantly, entrepreneurial business schools may escape regulatory oversight on the basis of their 
own market positioning as well as the failure of universities to translate regulatory standards into 
internal risk governance principles. 
4. Benchmarking with State-of-the-Art Risk Management 
Business schools (and their parents) face a so-called double-hurdle of risk, which consists of, first, 
the challenge of maintaining financial solvency in the face of increased market risk and, second, the 
need to cope with rising regulatory scrutiny (most likely by being subjected to some form of risk-
based regulation). As entrepreneurial risk-taking is evolving into the raison d’être of institutional 
existence, business schools are forced to move from managing performance risks on an ad hoc basis 
to a more deliberate approach. At the same time, they will have to comply with potentially detailed 
and constraining risk management regulations. The double hurdle implies that risk management 
appears on the agenda of business schools in two distinct ways, either as the outcome of 
organizational self-reflection that risk exposures need to be managed pro-actively or as a 
behavioural minimum standard defined by external parties. The former represents a change in the 
institutional objective, which will determine how and to what extent the organization is gravitating 
voluntarily toward the implementation of state-of-the-art risk management principles. The latter can 
shape outcomes if minimum standards translate into binding behavioural constraints. 
While the period leading up to the 2008 financial crisis has been characterized by reliable market 
growth, recent times have been more turbulent (Bienen and Boren 2010). Especially institutions 
focusing on post-experience education subsequently had to cope with substantial short-term revenue 
losses leading to faculty and staff layoffs, partial divestments and other forms of institutional 
restructuring (Bradshaw 2012). It is indicative of the fact that risk management of many business 
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schools is still in an embryonic state. They often lack formalized processes to ensure that key risks 
are accounted for in strategic decision-making. Risk exposures are frequently managed ex post 
when they have already developed into tangible problems (Wylie 2011).  
The spread of risk-based regulation will force business schools and their university parents to start 
investing in risk management capabilities and processes. This should not be misunderstood as a 
mere back-office activity to record risks and their probable impact or as a compliance function to 
fulfil regulatory norms. It is above all a cultural challenge to ensure that risk thinking becomes a 
pervasive organizational feature and that risks are adequately managed and accounted for at their 
source, the business school operations (Achampong 2010). Depending on the accepted level of 
entrepreneurialism, business schools will need to move distinctly beyond minimum standards set by 
external governance bodies. Risk management policies need to shield business schools against risk-
related ‘margin squeezes’, which requires analysing the risk dependency of operational returns on 
the school level and for individual activities. While operational measures will primarily target 
activity-level performance, adjustments of the business school’s ‘business model’ shape aggregate 
risk dependency by influencing the correlation structure across different activities.  
Risk management is often misunderstood as an activity to protect an organization against adverse 
developments emanating from a hostile environment. Examples of such exogenous risks are 
currency rate fluctuations impacting tuition revenues earned abroad or changes in public university 
funding schemes. Experience however shows that many critical risks are rather of an endogenous 
nature and emanate from the organization itself (Helsloot and Jong 2006). Endogenous risks can in 
principle be addressed in the context of designing the internal risk governance system. For that 
purpose, school-based risk management guidelines need to be mapped into a system defining risk 
ownership, risk management responsibilities and risk reporting standards. Endogenous risks are 
frequently reputation-related such as institutional non-compliance with market-wide professional 
standards or unethical behaviour of members of the school community.  
Risks can also be differentiated into so-called ‘white swans’ and ‘black swans’. White swans 
represent well quantifiable risks, frequently subject to the ‘law of large numbers’ and mean 
reversion. They lend themselves easily to probabilistic modelling, either based on historical data or 
by utilizing experience-based knowledge residing within the organization. The impact of a 
demographic downward trend in Western Europe’s student population on application numbers 
belongs to this category of risks.  In contrast, black swans are by their very nature unpredictable, 
singular, extreme-volatility events with a potentially game-changing impact (Taleb 2008). The 
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financial crisis represented such a black swan event. It unfolded unexpectedly, within a short period 
of time and with an impact scale threatening the financial solvability of schools and universities 
lacking adequate liquidity reserves. Risk management needs to deal with all swans independent of 
their colour. Black swans are however particularly challenging since they are impossible to predict 
and costly to manage ex ante.  
The management of white swans lends itself easily to a structured process involving risk 
identification, risk measurement, risk exposure quantification and risk mitigation (see e.g. URMIA 
2007). While regulatory regimes still de facto advocate a silo approach with each risk considered 
separately (see e.g. also AGB and UE 2009), state-of-the-art risk management aims to determine the 
overall performance impact using (Monte Carlo) simulation techniques in combination with 
scenario analysis, sensitivity analysis and, in an effort to account for management responses to 
uncertainty resolution, decision tree or real option analysis (Rees 2008). It represents a combination 
of qualitative procedures to collect relevant information internally (Chapman 2006), utilization of 
external data sources and quantitative modelling to determine the overall effect on financial 
performance (Vose 2008, Mun 2006). In the case of not-for-profit higher education institutions, the 
budget surplus serves as the obvious performance target. Following Froot et al. (1993), risk 
management should aim at achieving a minimum budget surplus with a certain level of statistical 
significance in order to ensure that the funding of critical investments does not fall victim to 
financial rationing. This logic lends itself to the application of an adapted version of the Cash-Flow-
at-Risk (CFaR) approach when considering per-period performance and of the Corporate Value-at-
Risk (VAR) framework when considering the aggregate net benefits of existing activities or new 
projects (Hommel 2009, RMG 1999).  
Risk mitigation targets the temporary or permanent reduction of risk exposures. Denneen and 
Dretler (2012) and Jansen (2010) propose rather naïve imitations of what can be seen in the 
corporate sector to protect the financial health of a HEI (overhead reduction, outsourcing of non-
core services, etc.), while D'Cruz and Soberman (2009) favour a more focused approach, for 
instance, reducing the dependency of non-degree revenues on discretionary corporate spending. 
Risk mitigation requires a risk-based endowment / capital structure policy (Massy 2008) and may 
for instance also involve the development of contingency plans for staff layoffs and the wind-down 
of loss-making activities (Marshall and Massy 2010). 
Black swans can in principle be managed within the same general framework, but not with the same 
methodology. To start with, organizations need to be aware that risk ignorance may give white 
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swans the appearance of being black (Triana 2009). In this context, stress testing can for instance 
create an understanding of which factors may move an activity or the organization as a whole into 
the lower tail of the budget surplus distribution or, more precisely, to the brink of financial failure. 
True black swans can however not be addressed with risk management systems designed to cope 
with everyday volatility. Risk models have a tendency of breaking down during periods of extreme 
volatility, Gaussian distributions become heavily skewed, correlations between different risks lose 
their validity and the concept of statistical significance turns into an illusion of certainty (Taleb 
2008).  
Black swans ultimately require a reactive capability approach, i.e. the development of flexibility in 
terms of resource deployment combined with the readiness to rapidly adjust operations in response 
to adverse events (Posner 2010). Business schools financing faculty growth with large-scale MBA 
and M.Sc. student recruitment in narrow geographical areas abroad represents the opposite of such 
an approach. The quasi-fixed cost nature of faculty salaries exposes the institution to a potential 
surplus squeeze, which can materialize due to singular events interrupting the inflow of students 
such as changes in visa regulations. Reactive capability results from the interplay between liquidity 
reserve policies and the deployment of flexible resources. If the latter implies trade-offs for the 
faculty time allocation between knowledge creation and the provisions of services for extra pay, 
then contingency planning will involve opportunity costs in terms of foregone reputation ex ante. 
In sum, state-of-the-art risk management differs from existing risk-based regulation frameworks in 
fundamental ways: (1) the classification of risks, (2) the measurement of institutional risk exposure 
on the basis of a portfolio approach and (3) the application of value-at-risk principles for the 
derivation of risk management objectives.  
5. Coping with Regulatory Change: Key Learning Points for Business Schools 
Business schools are not only at the forefront of transforming HEIs into entrepreneurial risk takers, 
they are also reservoirs of risk management competencies. The spread of risk-based regulation 
schemes promises either to add another layer of regulatory scrutiny for stand-alone business schools 
or, as the more typical case, to alter budgeting control policies applied by university parents. 
Business schools are, in this context, presented with a unique opportunity of advancing state-of-the-
art risk management principles as well as of pro-actively shaping their regulatory environment.  
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University parents will struggle to translate regulatory guidelines into operational systems of 
control on the school level. Adding additional compliance layers may offer partial compensation, 
such as requiring schools to go through ISO 31000 (risk management standards of International 
Organization for Standardization) certification or to create a risk management sub-committee of the 
School board with experienced corporate risk managers serving as members. Business schools can 
therefore use voluntary “over-compliance” as a credible signalling device to retain entrepreneurial 
degrees of freedom in the presence of greater regulatory scrutiny. 
As one of the basic design principles of risk-based regulation, oversight scrutiny should vary 
positively with the perceived ‘riskiness’ of the HEI. In order to secure these admittedly somewhat 
elusive benefits of quasi-deregulation, university parents must apply the same logic to the 
monitoring of their semi-independent sub-units, i.e., the tightness of budgetary controls will vary 
positively with the perceived degree of entrepreneurial risk-taking. In addition, the mapping of risk-
based regulation into intra-university risk management guidelines is likely to lead to behavioural 
guidelines for constituent schools mimicking financial debt contracts. Business schools are 
therefore expected to deliver a stable surplus contribution and ‘debt covenant’-style arrangements 
will penalize schools for defaulting on this promise. Such provisions favour risk avoidance over risk 
optimization, leading to a systematic underutilization of upside potential and are therefore second-
best choices to a properly functioning risk management system (see also Hommel 2005). This 
argument presents a strong reason for business schools to assume an active role in shaping 
university-level risk management policies. 
Existing risk-based regulation schemes focus exclusively on top-line performance at the university 
level. There are however good reasons to monitor and potentially control the allocation of volatility 
within university organizations. University parents will utilize risk-based budgeting and 
performance reviews to manage (semi-independent) sub-units such as business schools, which, in 
effect, leads to a balancing of centralized risk control and decentralized risk management 
responsibilities (Christensen 2010). Business schools are traditionally considered cash generators to 
fund cross-subsidization schemes within wider university structures and are therefore significant net 
contributors to performance volatility on the university level. The reverse logic may however apply 
as well. Regulators should therefore be concerned about universities passing on the burden of 
under-managed volatility unevenly, which may exacerbate the negative impact on the financial and 
ultimately academic performance for select schools – and, again, business schools are prime 
candidates. Doing so however represents potentially dangerous territory for universities as it may 
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weaken the top performers within their organization. Business schools can and should pre-empt 
such behaviour with the establishment of a state-of-the-art risk management programme. 
In conclusion, it cannot be denied that risk-based regulation represents a major change in the way 
regulatory bodies exercise oversight of HEIs and therefore business schools. It puts risk 
management firmly on the map for higher education managers. It will however not serve as an 
adequate reference point for business schools engaged in entrepreneurial activities. Regulatory 
intervention may lead to binding behavioural constraints due to methodological shortcomings, 
which can potentially be avoided by pro-actively implementing a state-of-the-art risk management 
system.  
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